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DISCRETIONARY
DECISIONMAKING IN THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES:
A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORKt
DANIEL J. GIFFORD*
For years, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has directed the profes-
sional public's attention to the prevalence of what he believes to be
insufficiently confined administrative discretion.' Davis has found
powers of unduly wide latitude in agencies and administrators, such as
tax collectors,2 police officers,3 welfare administrators,4 and independ-
ent agencies supervising business behavior.5 In general, Davis recom-
mends confining the discretionary powers of agencies and officials
more narrowly than they have been done in the past. He suggests that
where discretion cannot practically be so confined, it should be
"checked" or "structured."6 Thus, Davis urges that "one officer should
check another, as a protection against arbitrariness."' By structuring,
he means that agencies should justify their decisions by relating them
publicly to other decisions, rules, standards, principles, or policy
statements.8
t © 1983.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1953, Holy Cross College; L.L.B. 1958,
Harvard University.
I. Eg., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:1, at 157 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE]; K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMI-
NARY INQUIRY 15 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE].
2. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 42-43 (perfecting tax regulations by ex-
panding rules will always be necessary).
3. Id at 87-88.
4. Id at 180.
5. See id at 70 (Federal Trade Commission should make rules to give meaning to vague
terms).
6. See id at 54-55 (principal ways to control necessary discretion are checking and
structuring).
7. Id. at 142. "Checking includes both administrative and judicial supervision and re-
view." Id at 55.
8. Id at 97-141.
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This Article is a preliminary exploration of decisionmaking by
regulatory agencies. The purpose of this exploration is to identify those
types of discretionary decisions that can properly be subjected to con-
straints and those that are less susceptible to such constraints.
I. CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH DISCRETION CAN OR
CANNOT BE CONFINED OR STRUCTURED
One must examine the problems associated with administrative
discretion in an analytical framework that provides a basis for explor-
ing the relationship between discretion, and its exercise, and the devices
for structuring or confining discretion,9 such as standards and rules.
Thus, as Davis acknowledges, one can visualize official behavior taking
place on a spectrum,'" on one end of which precisely drawn rules con-
fine or eliminate the choices of officials, and on the other end of which
the absence of rules or decisional guides provide maximum discretion
to officials. This spectrum, joined with the inherent flexibility of lan-
guage, means that rules can be tailored to embody the exact amount of
precision or vagueness desired. Hence, those rules can confer as much
or as little discretion upon a regulator acting in any given context as is
desired." Rules can also, of course, structure and guide choice by em-
bodying standards or by setting forth factors that a decisionmaking of-
ficial is instructed to take into account in reaching his decisions.12
Davis has beneficially heightened the professional public's aware-
ness of the extent of uncontrolled discretion permeating the govern-
mental administrations and bureaucracies and has provided a refined
collection of tools for controlling discretion.' 3 Yet a major problem
remains unresolved: the development of criteria for optimizing the ex-
tent of official conduct that is, in various ways, confined or structured,
and the related question of the extent to which official conduct should
properly be discretionary.' 4
9. See 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 1, § 8:4, at 167-69 (discussing devices
to structure and confine discretion).
10. See id, § 8:4, at 168 (describing the movement from no standards to governing rules);
DISCRETIONARY JusTicE, supra note 1, at 15 (goal is to find the "optimum point on the rule-to-
discretion scale").
11. See 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 1, § 8:7, at 183-92 (ideal system con-
tains precisely the right mix of rule and discretion).
12. See id, § 8:4, at 169, § 8:7, at 189-90 (the best rules require that precedents be followed
or that departures be acknowledged or explained).
13. See id, § 8:7, at 183-92 (presenting 20 basic propositions about rule and discretion).
14. See, e.g., id, § 8:7, at 191 ("No published study has examined administration of an
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This Article attempts to supply some of the needed criteria. The
major premises of this Article are: (1) the proper guiding, structuring,
or confining of discretionary decisionmaking must ultimately be related
to the agency's information collection and evaluation processes because
authoritative rules or guides ought to be imposed upon decisionmakers
only when these rules or guides produce decisions of higher quality
than would be the case without them; (2) better informed people tend
to make higher quality decisions; (3) the decisionmaking process itself
is often a major source of agency information; (4) the value of agency
experience in deciding cases and as sources of relevant information for
the formulation of standards governing the disposition of future cases
is affected by the nature of the agency caseload.
A. THE RECURRENCE OF RELEVANT FACTS
One can derive an approach to determine the criteria for optimiz-
ing the use of rules, standards, and discretion within governmental ad-
ministration from Davis' main recommendation for controlling
administrative discretion. Davis acknowledges in his revision of the
nondelegation doctrine' 5 that legislative bodies will often find it im-
practical to formulate precise standards to be employed by administra-
tive officials. 6 Davis urges that in the absence of legislated standards
administrative bodies should create, over time, their own standards as a
result of their accumulated experiences.' 7
Much of Davis' language suggests that the administration experi-
ence itself aids agencies in narrowing the extent of their discretionary
power.'" Indeed, Davis envisions a process through which initially
wide discretion is narrowed-first by standards, then by principles, and
finally by rules."' Thus, Davis urges that "[w]hen legislative bodies
delegate discretionary power without meaningful standards, adminis-
trators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time, and then,
as circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion
agency's particular policies for the purpose of planning an optimum mix of rule and discretion for
those policies." (emphasis omitted)).
15. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15, at 208 (2d ed. 1978) (purpose of
nondelegation doctrine "should no longer be either to prevent delegation of legislative power or to
require meaningful statutory standards," but rather should be "to protect private parties against
injustice on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power" (emphasis omitted)).
16. See id, § 3:15, at 211 (legislators are "often unable or unwilling to supply" standards).
17. Id, § 3:15, at 211-12.
18. See, e.g., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note I, § 8:5, at 175-76 (commending
a proposal that agencies review their rules in light of their experience).
19. See id, § 8:4, at 168 (describing movement from guiding standards to governing rules).
1983]
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through principles and rules."2
Other commentators also advocate such a process, among them,
Judge Friendly:
[W]here the initial standard [provided by Congress] is thus general, it
is imperative that steps be taken over the years to define and clarify
it-to canalize the broad stream into a number of narrower ones. I
do not suggest this process can be so carried out that all cases can be
determined by computers; I do suggest it ought to be carried to the
point of affording a fair degree of predictability of decision in the
great majority of cases and of intelligibility in all.2'
The assumptions inherent in Davis' and Friendly's positions are:
(1) the administration of a statute is a learning process for an agency;
(2) repeated application of the statute to differing situations forces that
agency to evaluate specifically the various problems faced by regulated
subjects; (3) this repeated contact with the regulation in a variety of
circumstances helps the agency develop an overview of the problems;
(4) the needed narrowing of discretion comes from rules, standards,
and precedents that gradually emerge as the agency acquires more in-
formation about its tasks; and (5) this information comes, in part, from
the repeated decisionmaking.
A quite different approach towards the development of decisional
criteria is taken by those apologists for agency behavior who emphasize
the "factual" component of agency decisionmaking and deemphasize
the extent to which decisionmaking depends upon rules or precedents.
Usually, they describe agency work as resolving numerous cases in
which the particular factual components rarely repeat themselves.
Under this approach, precedents or rules play a smaller role in admin-
istrative decisions than in judicial decisions. This is due to the factual
variety of the cases coming before an agency for decision. Professor
Sharfman, the historian of the Interstate Commerce Commission, has
spoken in this way:
Perhaps the most comprehensive evidence of the pragmatic char-
acter of the Commission's regulative processes is to be found in the
relatively minor r[o]le played by precedent in the flow of administra-
tive determinations. The special facts of each controversy constitute
the dominant factor in its disposition, as a result of which very few
new complaints are foreclosed by prior determinations and even pro-
ceedings which have already been adjudicated are reopened ,with
striking frequency. The adjustments enforced 'by the Commission
20. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 15, § 4:15, at 213 (Supp. 1970).
21. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 14 (1962).
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come to manifest themselves in a continual process of change and
modification, induced by the dynamic forces constantly at work and
reflected in the adoption of trial-and-error methods tested by their
practical consequences. Not only do concrete findings change re-
peatedly, but the applicable rules, in terms of the guiding statutory
standards, are also modified from time to time as occasion seems to
require. The doctrines of res adjudicata [sic] and stare decisis, which
exert an important influence upon the course of proceedings in the
courts and upon the substantive character of judicial determinations,
are not permitted to impose limitations upon the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion. Neither specific determinations nor principles of
decision are clothed with any controlling degree of finality. While
the advantage of establishing certainty in rules of conduct is not
without recognition, and while the goal of maintaining stability and
consistency in regulatory policy is constantly in the foreground, these
considerations have not precluded primary stress upon the need of
flexibility of performance. Such need arises from the very nature of
the administrative method. Even quasi-judicial determinations are
made in the enforcement of standards which have not crystallized
into specific rules of law, and hence must depend, in predominant
measure, upon the special facts and circumstances disclosed in each
particular proceeding; and the affirmative adjustments prescribed,
which are essentially legislative in character, must necessarily be un-
restricted by prior determinations. Under these circumstances the
certainty and stability that might flow from rigid rules and unvarying
principles are appropriately subordinated to the demands of just and
reasonable performance, as molded by enlightened experience and
informed judgment.22
Sharfman's approach to administrative discretion does not reject
the values of decisional consistency inhering in Davis' and Friendly's
positions.23 Rather, Sharfman's deprecation of rules, precedents, stan-
dards, consistency, and predictability results from his different percep-
tion of the kinds of cases which form the bulk of the agency workload.
The nonrepetitious nature of these cases accounts for his emphasis
upon the importance of "the special facts of each controversy" and his
belief in the unimportance of precedent in that agency's work. 4
The different assumptions about the composition of administrative
22. 2 I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 367-68 (1931).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
24. See supra text accompanying note 22. See generally Gifford, Communication of Legal
Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409, 460-
61 (1971) (referring to each case as a unique event indicates that the role of the agency is manage-
rial rather than educational).
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workloads need greater explanation. Sharfman focuses upon agency
regulation in which factual patterns relevant to official disposition re-
cur infrequently.25 An agency in this situation finds it impractical to
develop rules in advance for handling cases. Even actual case disposi-
tions lack much significance as precedents because of the differences in
the factual composition of the cases.
Cases consisting of nonrecurring factual patterns destroy the effi-
ciencies normally associated with rulemaking.2 6 Ordinarily, rulemak-
ing enables an agency to formulate criteria to resolve a whole class of
cases. Thus an investment in rulemaking tends to lessen the decisional
burden which the agency would otherwise incur in deciding each of the
cases to which the rule applies. Moreover, an agency may improve the
quality of its decisions by concentrating its decisional resources in one
rulemaking procedure. This rulemaking approach, accordingly, may
enable the agency to explore the underlying regulatory problem more
deeply and thus to develop a set of solutions that are more effective
than those that the agency could derive from a series of cases involving
only one or a few parties. Finally, rules once promulgated, provide the
regulated public the opportunity of complying with them, thereby obvi-
ating the necessity of further agency action.
Davis and Friendly implicitly assume that the relevant factual pat-
terns, as perceived by the supervising regulatory agency, recur fre-
quently.27 Sharfman, in contrast, assumes the opposite.
The Sharfman conception and the Davis/Friendly conception of
the composition of an agency's caseload represent opposite ends of a
continuum. In the center of this continuum are core factual patterns
which tend to recur in association with sets of nonrecurring, more-or-
less relevant facts. Some of these nonrecurring facts rise to such a de-
gree of relevance as to be outcome determinative, while others do not.
For the type of caseload represented by the middle of this continuum,
an agency may establish standards, principles, or lists of factors to
guide its decisions, but it cannot constrain its decisionmaking with pre-
cisely drawn rules.
25. See supra text accompanying note 22. Because each controversy is comprised of special
facts, precedent cannot play a major role because the same rule cannot be used on different facts.
26. See, e.g., Gifford, Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision Connis-
sion, 20 VAND. L. REV. 777, 783-85 (1967) (discussing the efficiencies and practicalities of
rulemaking).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION
An agency decision may be "important" to the achievement of
overall regulatory goals in three ways.2" First, an agency decision may
be important solely because of the impact that particular decision has
on the agency's regulatory goals, apart from any significance the case
may have as precedent. For example, prior to the advent of interna-
tional competition in the American automobile market, one could have
made a plausible case that General Motors Corporation possessed an
undue amount of market power. Had the Federal Trade Commission
formally considered the dissolution of that firm into several manufac-
turing components, 29 the agency decision would have been important
in itself. It would not have mattered that the peculiar features of the
GM case which led the agency to consider the question of dissolution
were so unique that the case would have had virtually no effect as pre-
cedent for the decision of other cases.
Second, an agency decision in a particular case may be important
for its development of one or more standards3 ° or guides to be used in
the resolution of subsequent cases. The importance of a decision that
develops a standard depends upon the regularity with which the rele-
vant factual patterns recur in future cases. Even if a standard does not
28. See Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, I J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 310-11
(1972) (importance of a case as a precedent is derived from the public benefit gained from the
proceeding). Posner states that the goal of an administrative agency is to maximize the utility of
its law enforcement activity. Id at 305. He defines utility as the public benefit resulting from such
enforcement. Id Thus, cases may be described as "important" or "unimportant" to the degree
that they produce social benefits. See also Gifford, supra note 24, at 451 (cost-benefit approach
would lead an agency to devote more time to policy clarification affecting a large number of
transactions).
29. If a dissolution proceeding were to be brought, it might be based on § 7 of the Clayton
Act and would be directed at the series of corporate acquisitions that created the present firm. See
15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. V 1981) (prohibiting the acquisition of stock or other share of capital when
the effect of the acquisition tends to create a monopoly). See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1957) (charging that du Pont used its stock interest in
General Motors to become a monopoly supplier of GM's finishes and fabrics in violation of § 7 of
Clayton Act).
30. As used in this Article, the term "standards" is similar to, but not identical with, Profes-
sor Ronald Dworkin's "principles." Dworkin's principles point the way and must therefore be
taken into account; they possess a dimension of weight or importance, yet are not determinative in
an all-or-nothing fashion. See Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35 U. CHI. L. REy. 14, 25-28 (1967)
(discussing the difference between legal rules and principles). Because standards may be promul-
gated with infinitely variable degrees of precision, one may visualize them as being on a contin-
uum. As the standards become more precisely formulated, they become increasingly dispositive
of the cases to which they apply. See Gifford, supra note 24, at 443 ("relationship between (rela-
tively) precise and imprecise standards determines the division between conduct that is basically
self-regulated. . . and conduct that is allocated to individual decisions").
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dispose of all the issues that may arise in these cases, a standard's im-
portance will be a function of the number of times the issue arises and
the degree to which the resolution of the issue aids in disposing of those
cases. 31  For example, had the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), in the years before the Taft-Hartley Act, adopted general
standards to evaluate the application of the National Labor Relations
Act to independent contractors or supervisors, 32 the NLRB's formula-
tion of those standards would not necessarily have been dispositive of
any future case, but their formulation would certainly have assisted in
disposing of many cases.33
Third, a single agency decision may be important because it serves
as a precedent or rule that disposes of an entire class of cases.34 For
example, one workman's compensation board decided that hernia
claims are not compensable in the absence of corroboration by immedi-
ate and sustained disablement at the time the employee first claimed
symptoms. 35 Another example would be an Environmental Protection
Agency rule establishing the maximum permissible lead content of gas-
oline, effectively imposing rigid standards upon a whole class of indus-
31. If the standard is primarily useful in avoiding results that the agency might sometimes
reach in an ad hoc determination of a series of cases, then the importance of the standard is
reduced when the aggregate of avoided results does not significantly detract from the achievement
of the agency's overall regulatory goals. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
32. The NLRB did decide that the National Labor Relations Act was applicable to in-
dependent contractors and supervisors and the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB decisions. See,
e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947) (Labor Act entitles foremen to act
as a bargaining unit); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 135 (1944) (NLRB deci-
sion that newsboys are entitled to collective bargaining did not lack a rational basis). Congress
later repudiated both NLRB decisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (the term "employee" does
not include an independent contractor or a supervisor).
33. See Gifford, Declaratory Judgments Under the Model State Administrative Procedure
Acts, 13 Hous. L. REV. 825, 860 (1976) (application of National Labor Relations Act to complex,
non-recurring facts involved in Hearst Publications, Inc. weakened precedential value of the
decision).
34. The precedential effect of an adjudicatory decision affects the participation interests of
the parties involved. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 903-04 & n.4 (9th Cir.) (citing
cases in which institutional litigants would stand to benefit in the future from a new rule even
though they did not receive the benefit of that rule in the present case), rev'd, 396 U.S. 13 (1969);
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead" Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 95, 100 (1974) ("one-shot players" have little interest in the aspect of a decision that
might influence a future decision, whereas "repeat players" consider a decision that will influence
future cases to be a worthwhile result); Posner, supra note 28, at 311 ("usual defendant is uninter-
ested in whether the outcome of his case will have precedential significance").
35. See McCarthy v. Industrial Comm'n, 194 Wis. 198, 205, 215 N.W. 824, 826 (1927) (af-
firming order of Industrial Commission denying compensation for one who did not present suffi-
cient explanation of the cause of his hernia).
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trial firms.36 In these cases, the aggregate external impact of an agency
decision is measured by the total behavioral change which the rule
brings about. To the extent that a rule or precedent facilitates socially
useful behavior and thereby eliminates the need for many particular-
ized enforcement proceedings, the issuing agency also beneficially con-
serves its enforcement resources for other uses. Indeed, any agency
decision which contributes to the consistency of the agency's regulatory
approach and to improving the coherence of the regulatory scheme ad-
ministered by it helps further regulatory goals by facilitating overall
compliance with those goals by the regulated public. In summary, the
aggregate impact of an agency decision that formulates a standard to
address recurring issues consists largely in: (1) the effect of the standard
in discouraging behavior which would have been performed in the
standard's absence; (2) the saving in enforcement costs which the stan-
dard provides; and (3) the consistency in the agency's own disposition
of litigated cases which the standard engenders.
An overview of the different kinds of regulatory situations that
agencies face is illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal scale reflects the
extent to which patterns of relevant facts or factors recur, and the verti-
cal scale reflects the degree to which an agency's disposition of each
case contributes to overall regulatory goals; that is, the degree of regu-
latory "importance" of each case.
The upper half of Figure 1 represents those cases that are impor-
tant to the achievement of the agency's regulatory responsibilities. An
example of such a case might be a utility rate proceeding. Normally a
public service commission oversees only a few rate proceedings, but
each proceeding determines the utility rates that thousands of consum-
ers must pay. The commission's decision in each such case, therefore,
constitutes a significant part of the commission's overall responsibili-
ties. These considerations indicate that the proceeding falls in the
northern half of Figure 1. To the extent that the facts in a particular
rate case are unique to the time, place, and identity of the particular
utility before the commission, and are perceived as unique by the gov-
erning public service commission, such a rate proceeding belongs spe-
cifically in the NW section of Figure 1.
36. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir.) (final standards promulgated by
the EPA regarding lead in gasoline based on grams of lead per gallon of all gasoline produced
rather than standards for permissible lead use by each individual refiner), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976).
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important
NW NE
nonrecurring recurring
SW SE
unimportant
Figure 1
In the border area between the NE and NW sections of Figure 1
are those cases in which the agency decision is of significant importance
to the achievement of the agency's regulatory goals but whose gov-
erning factual patterns are neither fully recurring nor nonrecurring.
Although these cases possess recurring factual patterns, they also con-
tain other elements that occur sporadically, partially offsetting the sig-
nificance of their recurring factual elements towards particular
dispositions.
Agency decisions of cases represented in this border area tend to
create or apply standards rather than rules. Agency decisions in this
region are more free from precedent-setting constraints than in the cen-
tral or eastern areas of the NE section, but more are constrained than in
most of the NW section. Consider a determination of whether a partic-
ular merger violates section 7 of the Clayton Act.3 7 The Federal Trade
Commission finds such determinations to be a relatively important part
of its overall responsibilities. 8 Yet merger standards are now moder-
37. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
38. The United States Supreme Court has held that the FTC has no power to determine
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ately well developed, partially as a result of a series of decisions by the
Commission and the courts that have contributed to the development
of standards.39
In the NE section are those agency determinations, such as prece-
dent-setting adjudications and rulemaking proceedings, that effectively
determine the behavior of regulatory subjects in many instances in
which the relevant factual configurations are essentially repetitious. An
example of such a decision by an agency is the setting of pollution-
toleration limits affecting an entire industry. 0
The SE section contains that class of cases in which the relevant
facts tend to recur and the individual disposition does not significantly
affect the attainment of the agency's overall regulatory goals. Because
factual configurations tend to recur in this class of cases, it is possible
for an agency to develop standards and rules to govern their determina-
tion. Moreover, because resolving any particular case does not greatly
help achieve agency goals, the agency (if it wishes) can delegate deci-
sional responsibility to lower echelon personnel. This delegation can
be accompanied by standards or rules which the lower echelon person-
nel are required to employ in reaching their decisions.
The SW section contains that class of cases in which the facts are
nonrecurring and the individual disposition does not significantly affect
the attainment of the agency's overall regulatory goals. As is the case
whether a practice is an unfair method of competition. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421. 427 (1919). Subsequently, however, the FTC's rulemaking powers were upheld. See Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comn'n, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(substantive rules unquestionably implement § 6 of the Trade Commission Act, which provides
for the FTC's investigations of violations of antitrust statutes).
39. For cases articulating merger guidelines, see, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See also Merger
Guidelines, Issued by Justice Department on June 14, 1982, and, Attorney General's Statement and
FTC's Policy Statement on Horizontal Mergers, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 1069
(Special Supp. June 17, 1982) (guidelines describing the general principle and specific standards
normally used by Justice Department in analyzing mergers).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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with SE section cases, the agency can delegate decisional responsibility
to lower echelon personnel. But because the agency cannot practicably
develop standards for nonrecurring factual patterns, no meaningful
standards accompany this delegation.41
C. AGENCY WORKLOAD: A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
The next step in developing a conceptual framework with which to
view discretion is to assess the agency's workload in light of the meth-
ods that the agency employs to dispose of these cases. Sharfman essen-
tially describes a "managerial" mode of decisionmaking by an
agency.4" Under this mode an agency sees the factual patterns in the
cases before it as largely nonrecurring, and thus can only approach the
decision of each case in an ad hoc manner. This approach requires an
agency to balance the competing considerations in every case. It be-
comes more manager than regulator.
Figure 2 illustrates the degree to which the agency decides in a
managerial way or, alternatively, decides on a rule-oriented regulatory
basis by using criteria applicable to a class of cases, the criteria being
formulated on the basis of the pros and cons affecting the entire class.
Figure 2 represents not only the composition of the agency's workload
in terms of the relative importance of the individual cases and the re-
currence of relevant factual patterns, as in Figure 1, but the east-west
dimension also reflects the degree to which the managerial mode of
decisionmaking is used.
This second element reflecting the degree to which the agency de-
cides in a managerial mode should correspond to the original horizon-
tal scale which reflects the degree of recurrence of relevant factual
patterns in the cases before the agency. The two factors differ to the
extent that the agency is ignorant of recurring relevant factual patterns.
Any noncorrespondence between the two measures suggests that the
agency uses inefficient means of decisionmaking and thus increases the
cost of regulation. It also suggests that the agency deserves the criti-
cisms of Davis, Friendly, and other advocates of narrowing and struc-
turing discretion.
41. For a discussion of organizational reasons for agency delegation of authority unaccom-
panied by decisional criteria to lower level personnel, see Gifford, supra note 24, at 461-65.
42. See 2 I. HARFMAN, supra note 22, at 367-68 (CommiSsion asserts the prerogative to
decide how each incident that comes to its attention should be handled on ad hoc grounds). See
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Refiections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76
HARV. L. REV. 755, 762 (1963) ("convenience and utility may in an urgent case override the
particular allocation of roles in the systematic context").
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important
NW NE
managerial; rule oriented;
nonrecurring recurring
SW SE
unimportant
Figure 2
Two other elements of agency operation deserve discussion. The
first element is the agency's decisionmaking costs stated in terms of the
ratio of the actual amount of decisional resources consumed in the par-
ticular decision to the total decisional resources that are available to
that agency for all decisions. The second element is the estimated regu-
latory benefit of each decision, stated in terms of the ratio of the esti-
mated net regulatory benefit produced by the particular decision to the
total regulatory benefit produced by all of the agency's decisions.4 3 If
the agency employs the proper mix of rulemaking, standard making
and standard applying, and managerial decisionmaking, then, for any
given decision, the ratios of these two measures as applied to the deci-
43. Net regulatory benefit is the extent of the regulatory contribution of the action taken by a
regulatory authority to further regulatory goals minus the unintended but unavoidable adverse
consequences of the regulatory action. See supra note 28. Such determinations, of course, can
only be estimates. Attempting to quantify such estimated net benefits tends, in practice, to be
difficult. See, e.g., Smithies, Conceptual Framework for the Program Budget, in PROGRAM BUDG-
ETING 24, 39-40 (D. Novick ed. 2d ed. 1967) (monetary valuations of future costs and benefits
"contain a strong element of artificiality").
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sion should be equal regardless of the section of Figure 2 in which the
decision falls.
For many agencies, the potential aggregate net regulatory benefit
of decisions disposing of cases falling in the NE section is likely to be
high. Because decisions in the NE section generally achieve their net
regulatory benefit from their precedent-creating or rule-creating effects,
these decisions determine results and affect the behavior of subjects not
involved in the case. Because it is difficult for factually unique and
hence self-contained cases to attain an equivalent regulatory impact, it
would not be surprising if for many agencies, the most important cases
were concentrated in the NE section of Figure 2. This belief underlies
the critiques of Davis, Friendly, and others who desire increased
agency efforts to develop standards for decisionmaking. 4 Decisional
resources should normally be allocated according to the regulatory
benefits that they produce.45 If an agency's resource allocation were
skewed away from rulemaking or precedent-setting decisions, it would
suggest that the agency is either one to which the Davis and Friendly
critiques do not apply because the patterns of relevant facts do not fre-
quently recur in the agency caseload, or one that neglects its duty to
develop decisional standards.
Similarly, decisionmaking in the SE section is easier than in the
SW section, because SE section decisionmaking is largely the applica-
tion of preexisting rules to recurring factual patterns and involves the
development of only slight accretions of policy. Also, many potential
cases fail to rise to the level of formal disputes because the behavior of
regulated subjects may follow rules announced in the precedent-setting
or rule-formulating NE section determinations. Therefore, the poten-
tial for agency resource expenditure in the SE section cases is lessened
significantly whenever a NE section precedent or rulemaking decision
removes issues from potential disputes, disputes which otherwise would
have fallen into that part of the agency's caseload represented by the
SE section.
By contrast, because cases in the SW section contain nonrecurring
fact situations, that type of caseload is not reducible by agency efforts
to issue rules or precedents. Agencies with caseloads composed of
44. See supra notes 1-8, 20-21 and accompanying text.
45. Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner has pointed out that apparently minor cases may
contribute "disproportionately" to the achievement of regulatory goals. Posner, supra note 28, at
311. Accordingly, an agency which rationally attempts to maximize regulatory goals tends to
devote more resources to relatively minor cases than seems appropriate to superficial observers,
Id These observers may then criticize the agency for misallocating its resources.
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many SW-type cases, therefore, will find it exceedingly difficult to re-
duce their costs of operation.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CRITICS AND CASELOAD TYPES
1. Confining Discretion
Criticisms of administrative behavior which focus upon the failure
of many agencies to develop standards and rules that reduce the
amount of discretionary decisionmaking in their operations appear,
upon analysis, to be applicable primarily to agency caseloads falling
within the NE and SE sections of Figures 1 and 2. Since the NW and
SW sections contain cases in which factual patterns tend not to recur,
the development of standards or rules for those cases does not seem
feasible. Davis and Friendly, however, would probably contend that
the scope of the NE and SE sections is in fact larger than the agencies
which they criticize perceive. They would argue that factual regulari-
ties recur within cases that these agencies treat as belonging to the NW
and SW sections. They would urge each of those agencies to examine
its cases more carefully, for if it did, it would uncover as yet unob-
served factual regularities. In other words, these critics recommend
that agencies reconsider their caseloads in light of the frequency with
which relevant factual patterns recur. If agencies did reconsider their
caseloads in this light, they would find that many cases that the agency
presently believes fall within the NW and SW sections in fact fall
within the NE and SE sections.
2. The Problem of Delegation
Landis and Davis have criticized the failure of agencies to delegate
authority to subordinates.46 They argue that the policymaking eche-
lons of many agencies dissipate resources by spending too much time
deciding particular cases.47 These critics fault agencies for overusing
the managerial mode of decisionmaking. 48 The delegation they urge
seems to require that the delegating agency concomitantly formulate
decisional standards to impose upon subordinate personnel.
46. See I K. DAvis, supra note 15, § 3:17, at 218-19 (citing a presidential speech and congres-
sional statutes favoring subdelegation); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO PRESIDENT-ELECT 65
(Comm. Print 1960) (J. Landis, author) (critiquing the lack of coherent delegation policies in
government agencies) [hereinafter cited as ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
47. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 15, § 3:17, at 218 ("unimportant details occupy far too
much of the time and energy of [top-level] agency members") (quoting President Kennedy).
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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An increase in delegation, accompanied by a set of decisional stan-
dards, would affect the cases falling within the SE section. Thus, a
contention that an agency has delegated decisionmaking authority
without sufficient standards seems to be a claim either that the agency
has improperly retained an ad hoc mode of decisionmaking of many
cases falling into the SE section, or that the agency has erroneously
perceived many cases as falling within the NE section, whereas the lim-
ited individual significance of these cases actually places them in the
SE section.
The inability of an agency to supply detailed decisional criteria to
subordinates does not mean that the agency ought not to delegate. In-
deed, an agency may be unable to supply such detailed criteria even
after a delegation has been in effect for some time. Hence, many agen-
cies that refuse to delegate remain vulnerable to criticism. In fact, the
SW section contains cases with minimal individual significance, and
which, therefore, ought not be decided by high level agency members.
Yet, the cases falling into that category tend to lack recurring factual
patterns, and thus are not susceptible to governance by precisely drawn
rules. For cases falling into this category, the agency can do little but
delegate decisionmaking authority without meaningful standards. For
caseloads of this type, the best that the agency can do is to employ
subordinate personnel whose judgments are mature and considered.
Agency responsibility here consists largely of the careful selection of
personnel who are entrusted with decisionmaking power.
The police, an institution sometimes criticized for failure to formu-
late adequate rules to govern the behavior of its personnel, may be an
agency whose basic workload is heavily weighted with SW section
cases. Many situations requiring decisions by police officers may not
have recurring factual patterns and thus are not susceptible to govern-
ance by rules.49 Decisions made in each of these section SW situations
49. One student of police behavior states:
[Tihe exercise of discretion seems necessary in the current criminal justice system for
reasons unrelated to either the interpretation of criminal statutes or the allocation of
available enforcement resources. This is because of the special circumstances of the indi-
vidual case, particularly the characteristics of the individual offender which "differenti-
ate him from other offenders in personality, character, sociocultural background, the
motivations of his crime, and his particular potentialities for reform or recidivism." The
infinite variety of individual circumstances complicates administration by mere applica-
tion of rules.
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 71 (1965) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Glueck, Predictive Device and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 461, 461 (1958)). But see DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 80-96 (police
should make policy through rulemaking). Professor Davis, however, candidly acknowledges that
police officers need significant amounts of discretion to deal with circumstances that are unique
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have minimal societal significance. Police organizations recognize
these characteristics of their workload and therefore delegate decision-
making to officers on patrol. Those organizations do not attempt to
circumscribe those delegations with rules or standards, other than con-
clusory ones. °
II. A PRELIMINARY APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK: THE EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS
AND THE PROCESS OF "MUDDLING
THROUGH"
The conceptual framework of regulatory discretion developed in
section I may be used to analyze commentary on regulatory discretion.
An example of this application may be seen in appraising the Friendly
and Davis model of regulation in which agencies gradually develop
decisional standards .5  This model assumes that agencies gradually
perceive regularities in the factual patterns of the cases and the agen-
cies continuously adjust to these perceptions to react to them in a con-
sistent way. As was explained in section I, however, the patterns of
relevant facts do not always recur in an agency's caseload. Conse-
quently, the Friendly and Davis model is not always applicable.
Friendly's famous critique of the federal regulatory agencies can
also be used to illustrate the application of the conceptual framework
of regulatory discretion thus far developed. Friendly faulted the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) for its inconsistent analyses of the role of
competition in route and certification decisions. 2 Friendly studied the
Board's principal decisions from 1938 through 1961. During that pe-
riod, the CAB, according to Friendly, shifted course a number of times
and never developed a thorough understanding of the workings of air-
line competition. 3 The CAB, accordingly, never produced a set of
standards or decisional guides which it was willing to follow for any
substantial period. Friendly concluded that:
[T]he Board should have conducted regular studies of the benefits
and nonrecurring. See K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 129 (1976) (rules for
police should not impair individualizing).
50. Professor Davis points out that the formulation of rules that reflect the variety and com-
plexity of the circumstances that police officers are likely to encounter may themselves be so com-
plex as to be useless to police officers of average skill and training. See K. DAVIS, supra note 49, at
129 (rules must be short and simple enough for use by ordinary patrolman).
51. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
52. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 21, at 74-105 (detailing the changes in the CAB's treatment
of issues from 1938 to 1961).
53. See id at 105 (agency failed to understand its area of regulation).
1983]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:101
and costs of competition and then utilized the experience of the past
as a guide to what might reasonably be anticipated with the traffic
and equipment of the future. Above all it should have written clear,
consistent, reasoned opinions or policy statements-facing up to
problems rather than sweeping them under the bed, and regularly
informing the Congress, the industry, and the public just what it was
doing with the nation's air route structure and why, rather than being
all things to all men and ultimately satisfying none except itself-if,
indeed, it really did that.54
Friendly thus attributed the Board's waffling on the competition
question to its lack of adequate information. This lack seems to be
attributable to the CAB's information collection and information eval-
uation mechanisms.
The fault that Friendly attributed to the CAB is related to the
faults that other critics attribute to other regulatory agencies: failure to
plan; failure to anticipate industry developments; and failure to make
effective use of rulemaking." All of the CAB's failures and similar
failures by other agencies are manifestations of the same underlying
deficiency. All are traceable to the agency's failure to garner adequate
information about the subject matter which it is charged with
regulating.
An agency that purports to regulate when it possesses limited in-
formation about its subject matter behaves in the "muddling" way that
Professor Lindblom so brilliantly describes.56 The agency accepts basic
patterns and imposes change only incrementally. 57 If a change pro-
duces undesirable results, then the agency slightly enlarges the scope of
its search for an alternative. If the change produces desirable results,
54. Id at 104-05.
55. See ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 46, at 18, 44 (critiquing the lack of
coherent delegation policies in government agencies); R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 93-94
(1971) (agencies not inclined to evaluate industry and agency performance); Hector, Problems of
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 932 (1960) (planning and
policymaking by commission "accomplished with appalling inefficiency"); Minow, Letter to Presi-
dent Kennedy, Suggestionsfor Improvement of theAdministrative Process, 15 AD. L. REV. 146, 147
(1963) (lack of effective policymaking results in inconsistent decisions).
56. Lindblom, The Science of"Muddling Through," 19 PuB. ADM. REV. 79 (1959) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lindblom, Muddling Through]; Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48 AM, ECON. REV. 298
(1958). But see Dror, Muddling Through-Science of Inertia, 24 PuB. ADM. REV. 156 (1964) (ques-
tioning the universal applicability of Lindblom's model of decisionmaking); Hirschman & Lind-
blom, Economic Development, Research and Development Policy Making: Some Converging Views,
7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 220-21 (1962) (contrasting Lindblom's view of policymaking as a generally
remedial process with Hirchman's emphasis on the need for prospective analysis in economic
policymaking).
57. See Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 56, at 79.
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then the agency continues in this incremental mode. The significant
premise of this approach to decisionmaking lies in the safety attached
to successful past experience: if everything has worked satisfactorily in
the past, then future catastrophe can be avoided by staying close to
what has already proven successful.
A difficulty with a "muddling through" approach arises when in-
dustry circumstances change drastically, rendering past regulatory ex-
perience obsolete. Similarly, another difficulty with this approach
arises when cases coming before the agency do not manifest recurring
fact patterns. Absent significant factual repetition, the agency's experi-
ence in handling one regulatory problem does not prepare it to handle
another.5 8 As a result, the agency does not learn from its prior experi-
ence. The agency is unable to experiment, introducing gradual and in-
cremental changes, because the vast disparity in the factual patterns of
its cases depreciates the value of using its prior experiences as sources
of information.
The deficiencies of the "muddling through" mode of decisionmak-
ing are dramatically illustrated by the CAB's failure during forty years
of airline regulation to understand and replicate by regulation the im-
pact of a competitive market. 59 Historically, a powerful argument for
deregulation was that it would permit the airlines to limit the number
of flights and thereby reduce the number of unfilled seats on each
flight. As airlines competed for passengers to fill the seats on large air-
liners, prices would decrease. Patrons enticed by the low fares would
fill the planes to capacity, and unit costs per passenger would fall. Air-
lines would incur lower costs and passengers would pay lower fares.
Yet, despite its continued waffling on the competition issue, the CAB
never seems to have attempted to employ a competitive model as a
standard by which to assess the effects of its regulatory decisions.6
58. Cf. C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 172 (2d ed. 1979)
(stressing that control of premises of decisions is the problem for organizations); C. PERROW,
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 60 (1970) (when manufacturing processes
undergo extremely rapid and frequent changes, useful generalizations about safety factors are
unlikely); W. BENNIS & P. SLATER, THE TEMPORARY SOCIErY 56 (1968) ("[b]ureaucracy's
strength is its capacity to manage efficiently the routine and predictable").
59. See W. FRUHAN, JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: A STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC TRUNK AIR CARRIERS 169 (1972) (until at least 1971 the CAB was
concerned more with carrier bankruptcies than with the capacity problem which was the main
issue of competition in the industry).
60. See, e.g., COMM'N ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AM. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL REGULA-
TION: ROADS TO REFORM 36 (1978) ("the CAB's staff has described the results of the board's
carrier selection processes as 'random' ").
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Lindblom's conception of "muddling through" was intended as a
substitute for more "rational" models of decisionmaking in which offi-
cials select the best decision from an exhaustive inventory of possible
solutions.6' Lindblom quite correctly points out that fully rational
decisionmaking models are unrealistic as either descriptions of, or
norms for, actual regulatory decisionmaking because decisionmakers
never have complete information.6 z Most of the time, they have little
information beyond the past history of the subject and their own deal-
ings with it. "Muddling through," then, is intended to be both a de-
scriptive model of how actual decisions are made and a normative
model indicating how an agency could make good decisions with in-
complete information.
It is apparent, therefore, that the "muddling through" model of
decisionmaking is inappropriate for situations when an agency cannot
obtain information needed to decide future cases from its experience
with past cases.63 The model is inappropriate because of the variety of
factual patterns in the cases coming before an agency for decision, or
because of significant change in an industry. In these circumstances,
adequate regulation requires an agency to collect and evaluate signifi-
cant amounts of information about the regulatory setting in which it
must act, beyond the information of the particular facts of the case
before it and the information it has collected from deciding past cases.
Indeed, in the situations described, the agency must collect information
extensively, in the manner in which it would proceed were it to be en-
gaged in rulemaking.
March and Simon have pointed out a flaw in the decisionmaking
process that makes it even more difficult to gather needed informa-
tion.64 They assert that when the managers of an organization become
deeply involved in day-to-day decisionmaking, they frequently lose the
time and perspective needed to take a long view of the organization's
operations. Hence, they become unable to plan, especially for major
contingencies.65 The phenomenon identified by March and Simon is
related to the CAB behavior described by Friendly. By regulating on a
61. Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 56, at 80.
62. Id at 81.
63. An agency may lack the necessary information because of the variety of factual configu-
rations in the cases coming before it for decision or because of the occurrence of significant
changes in the regulated industry.
64. See generally J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 172-210 (1958) (how organiza-
tional dynamics affect innovation and planning).
65. See id at 185 ("[d]aily routine drives out planning").
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case-by-case, incremental basis, the CAB lost sight of the long view of
airline operations.
For agency decisions to constitute a process through which stan-
dards gradually emerge, not only must the cases contain significant reg-
ularities but the agency must perceive these regularities. These
regularities must not be offset by the occurrence of factors that signifi-
cantly affect the agency's ultimate evaluations. Regularities in the fac-
tual patterns must not be offset by overriding changes in the industry
which render obsolete the standards that would otherwise emerge.
Absent relevant regularities, an agency may devise standards by
collecting and evaluating information that comes from sources beyond
those normally relied upon in an adjudication. Collecting information
concerning the technological state of the industry and assessing the im-
plications of the developing technology may enlarge an agency's under-
standing of the industry's problems. In this way the agency increases
its awareness of and sensitivity to the dynamics of industry operation
and development, as opposed to the static snapshot perception that an
adjudicative record may produce.66 From this enlarged understanding,
an agency may approach regulatory governance in ways geared to pres-
ent and anticipated industry changes.
III. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DECISIONS:
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE OCCURRENCE
AND THE EXTENT OF JUSTIFICATION
Agency decisions may be classified by the extent to which they rely
on a class justification (an analysis of a set of facts common to a class of
cases), and by the extent to which agency decisions rely on a unique
justification (an analysis of the facts of a particular case). Additionally,
agency justifications may be classified by the elaborateness of their log-
ical structure.
Figure 3 includes these two measures superimposed along the hor-
izontal and vertical axes of the previous figures. This superimposition
illustrates two assertions. First, an agency in "important" cases is likely
to provide a relatively elaborate justification for its action, often in an
66. This approach resembles the "mixed scanning" approach proposed by Professor Etzioni.
For descriptions of the mixed scanning approach, see A. ETzIONI, THE ACTIVE SocIETY 282-305
(1968). See also Etzioni, Mixed-Scanning: .4 "Third" Approach to Decision-Making, 27 PUB.
ADM. REV. 385, 389 (1967) (explaining how the mixed-scanning approach includes some elements
of both the rational model and incremental model by collecting information in complete detail for
a few areas of concern).
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opinion accompanying its decision. Second, an agency, in "unimpor-
tant" cases tends to justify its actions, if at all, by succinct references to
rules, precedents, or prior practice.
elaborate justification;
important
unique justification;
managerial;
nonrecurring
class justification;
rule oriented;
recurring
simple or no justification;
unimportant
Figure 3
When an agency approaches an area in which it believes the rele-
vant facts are likely to recur, and that the regulatory policy in its aggre-
gate effect is "important" to the goals of the governing statute, the
agency tends to announce its policy either in a "rule" or in an opinion,
which, because of precedential value, performs a similar function. Be-
cause the rulemaking decision or the issuance of the precedent-setting
decision effectively sets the criteria for the treatment of future behavior,
the initial agency decision announcing the rule or establishing the pre-
cedent is necessarily more important to the achievement of regulatory
goals than decisions applying that rule or using the decision as prece-
dent. In this situation the original decision falls higher on the vertical
scale than do the later decisions applying the standard or precedent.
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Both the initial rulemaking or precedent-setting decision and its subse-
quent applications tend to fall to the right on the horizontal scale.
One may expect elaborate justification even in important cases
that do not contain recurring factual patterns, ie., do not have signifi-
cant precedential effect. This is true so long as the disposition of each
case by itself helps significantly to further regulatory goals. This expec-
tation is partly due to procedural constraints (namely, the agency may
be obligated by law to provide a justification), and partly because the
agency may have assembled its workload to make such a justification
easy. It is also so partly because the substantial impact that agency
disposition of such a case will have on an affected private party is likely
to induce that party to employ the available procedures to force the
agency to respond in detail to his objections and defenses.
On the lower part of Figure 3-where the decisions of lesser im-
portance fall--decisions do not tend to be elaborately justified. Where
the relevant factual patterns tend not to recur, decisions cannot be con-
vincingly justified by references to rules or precedents, because neither
rules nor precedents are formulated for cases falling in the western part
of Figure 3. Moreover, officials charged with dealing with these cases
may experience pressures to dispose of them without elaborately justi-
fying their decisions. These pressures are the result of the relative
unimportance of each of these decisions, the frequency with which
these cases are likely to arise and the correspondingly heavy caseload
of the deciding officials,67 the limited avenues of formal recourse, and
the often limited economic resources available to adversely affected
persons to pursue such procedural routes of redress as are formally
available. The justifications provided by the agency will tend to be one
of a small number of stock justifications. Forwarding such stock justifi-
cations may be the normal practice, for example, of arresting officers68
completing the required police report, welfare administrators making
67. The disposition of a heterogeneous caseload would involve more time and effort than the
disposition of a homogenous caseload of equal size because the experience of deciding particular
cases is less transferable to other cases in the former context than in the latter.
68. Police work requires large numbers of individual decisions, each of minimal social im-
portance. Many of these decisions involve nonrecurring fact patterns, and almost all of them are
made outside the constraints of formal procedures. For these reasons, police decisions are an
example of "unimportant" official decisions, which are not governed by rules and which in gen-
eral tend not to be elaborately justified, namely, the kind of decisions which fall in the SW section
of Figure 3. While many police decisions are ungoverned by rules, many do, nevertheless, fall
into recurring factual patterns. In such instances, it is incorrect to assume that because formal
rules do not exist, these decisions are totally unguided. The officer's experience and the advice
which he receives from fellow officers tend to provide guides to the conduct of police officers on
patrol. See generally Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and administrative Justice, 37 LAW
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adverse decisions, and immigration officials 69 deciding questions per-
taining to the eligibility of persons to enter the United States.
Low level personnel should decide cases when heavy caseloads
consist of individual cases of small significance and recurring factual
patterns. Those personnel will probably be guided in their decision-
making by rules that have been prepared by officials on the middle or
lower rungs of the agency hierarchy. When low level bureaucrats are
charged with deciding large volumes of cases, recurring issues not gov-
erned by such rules will probably be decided on the basis of prior prac-
tice. Those low echelon officials will probably not manifest much
flexibility in their approach to cases, nor will they provide elaborate
justifications on the merits for their decisions. Caseload pressures and
an inability to incorporate their experience into formal governing rules
would prevent them from offering elaborate justifications. In short, de-
cisions of this type will tend to be justified by precedent or rules; justifi-
cations on the individual merits of particular cases will occur
infrequently; and deviations or flexible responses to novel questions
will be few.
Figure 1 indicates the areas in which rules and standards might be
expected to develop most easily and where they might be expected to
develop with difficulty or not at all. Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the
formulation of standards in the manner visualized by Friendly and Da-
vis is probably further restricted to the more important cases and
largely to those that are decided in the context of formal proceedings.
To the extent that justifications either are not made or are not elaborate
enough to distinguish and reconcile prior decisions, the process of grad-
ual standard development does not often occur. Figure 3 and its ac-
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22-26 (1972) (discussion of processes through which interaction with col-
leagues tends to generate decisional criteria).
Professor LaFave has found that descriptive criteria can be formulated and applied to police
behavior and can predict behavior in some identifiable areas. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 49, at
83-152. Of course, the areas in which officers draw upon their experience or the absorbed advice
of their colleagues for assistance are or may be areas in which relevant fact patterns do recur, but
in which the combination of experience and advice could not be reduced to written rules or
guides. This is because the complexity of the factors, the difficulties of ascribing weights to those
factors, and the presence of sporadic and unpredictable other factors impose modifications upon
the course of conduct actually pursued.
When superior officials lack the information possessed by their subordinates, or when their
attempt to incorporate that information into a set of rules or standards would prove confusing to
those subordinates, an attempt at rulemaking by the superiors would be misplaced. In such cir-
cumstances, rules would tend to lower the quality of subordinate behavior.
69. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note I, at 104-05 (Immigration and Naturalization
Service provides reasons for denial of applications through a mechanism which allows the INS to
select one or more pre-stated rationales).
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companying analysis, by classifying various cases, reveal why the
process of gradual development of standards may not occur on the
lower bureaucratic levels. It does not occur because of the interaction
of heavy caseloads, individually insignificant cases, bureaucratic rigid-
ity, and unaggressive regulatory subjects. As explained above, how-
ever, the experience and practice of lower echelon personnel may
establish decisional standards. These standards, however, often are not
incorporated into formal rules because the lower echelon personnel,
who have developed the practices based upon their own and their col-
leagues' experiences, usually lack the authority to formalize their prac-
tices. Moreover, their superiors cannot incorporate these practices into
formal rules because they often lack the experience-based information
that underlies those practices. Figure 3 also calls attention to another
administrative phenomenon: rules that do govern decisionmaking by
lower echelon personnel tend to be less flexible than the facts of the
individual cases may merit.
IV. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OR NONDISCLOSURE OF
AGENCY DECISIONS
Figure 3, developed to identify various characteristics of agency
decisionmaking, will now be given an additional dimension to symbol-
ize the extent to which agency decisions are open or public as opposed
to closed or secret.
Figure 4 is a three-dimensional illustration that symbolizes, as the
height on the vertical scale increases, the increased degree of openness
of an agency decision.
A. APPLICATIONS OF THE OPENNESS DIMENSION
1. Behavioral Standards
Agencies responsible for formulating and developing behavioral
standards have incentives to publicize each new behavioral require-
ment, because no one can follow such standards unless one knows of
their existence and content. To the extent that these behavioral stan-
dards are enforced by lower echelon officials, superiors in the agency
must make the standards known to both lower ranking enforcement
officials and the regulated public. Cases using standards designed to
regulate future behavior tend to fall to the east on the two-dimensional
grid because they necessarily apply to recurring sets of facts. Agency
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open
NE class justifications-
elaborate justifications; rule-oriented;
important recurring
unique justification; simple justification;
managerial; > unimportant
nonrecurring
SW
secret
Figure 4
decisions that adopt the standards tend to fall in the northern portion
of the grid (namely, the NE section), while the official actions taken in
enforcing or applying them will tend to fall in the SE section of the
grid. Because the standards will be publicized to serve their normative
function, they fall in the higher regions of Figure 4 (the higher regions
of the NE section).
2. Leniency Standards
Agencies formulating standards that provide lenient treatment for
first offenders or minor infractions may keep those standards secret so
as not to encourage violations.7" Because these standards are generaliz-
able and hence of significant regulatory importance, decisions adopting
them would fall in the northern portion of Figure 4. And because they
would tend to apply to cases whose relevant facts recur they would fall
in the eastern part of that illustration. Decisions adopting those stan-
70. See Gifford, supra note 24, at 435 (uncertainty about the applicability of laws can be
used as a regulatory device).
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dards also fall in the lower portion of the vertical scale because they
would be kept secret.
3. Examples from the Chicago Police Department
a. Embedded organizational norms: Davis, in a study of the Chi-
cago Police Department, found that police officers of almost all ranks
believe that they are governed by a norm that requires them to enforce
all laws fully.7' Although almost all officers also recognized that the
department lacked the resources to carry out this full enforcement, they
also believed that the department had no right to designate specified
laws for nonenforcement.72 Most police officers believed that such a
decision would be a political one within the exclusive province of the
legislature.73
Higher ranking officials in the department could formulate criteria
to allocate limited police resources. But the higher in the department
hierarchy that a decision about allocating resources is made, the greater
would be its impact on police behavior because of its wide scope.
Thus, the higher in the department hierarchy the decision is made, the
more the decision appears to violate the two basic norms governing
police behavior: full enforcement of all laws and the avoidance of
political decisions.74 These norms both discourage high ranking police
officials from allocating resources by categories of offense and discour-
age public disclosure of any such decisions actually made. Moreover,
the higher in the department hierarchy such a resource-allocation deci-
sion is made, the more vulnerable to public discovery are those deci-
sions. Hence, the police officers who make the decisions would be
more vulnerable to criticism for violating basic department norms.
Organizational rigidity extends even further. Middle level police
officials do not make decisions about nonenforcement, because those
officials believe (correctly) that their superiors adhere to the general
norms mandating full enforcement and forbidding political decision-
making. If these middle level officials were to make a nonenforcement
decision, they would be subject to disciplinary action by their superiors.
The police example thus illustrates how embedded organizational
71. K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1, 34 (1975) [hereinafter cited as POLICE DISCRETION].
72. Id at 34, 90.
73. Id at 91-92.
74. Most police officers instinctively accept the argument that the police force is a
subordinate agency and does not have the "power to undo what the legislative body does." Id at
92. Thus, police officers do not feel that it is within their province to make the political decision of
changing the law by not enforcing what a legislative body has ordered enforced.
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norms may sometimes preclude certain types of rulemaking and dictate
that a major decision to misallocate resources by default be kept secret.
b. Avoidance ofpublic criticism: Davis' study of the Chicago Po-
lice Department revealed that almost all police officers did not make
arrests for the possession of small amounts of marijuana.75 The police
department hierarchy felt unable to sanction the no-arrest policy not
only because it feared that such a nonenforcement decision would con-
stitute a forbidden political decision, but also because the department
had an incentive to deny the practice or at least to be ignorant of it.
Public admission of the practice would expose the department to the
protestations of large numbers of citizens who expect the police to en-
force the marijuana laws fully.
c. The need for organizationally directed responses: Davis criti-
cizes the reluctance of the Chicago Police Department to admit that the
marijuana laws were not being fully enforced. Because that (nonen-
forcement) practice rises to a level of major political importance,76 Da-
vis believes it ought to be both publicized and subjected to the scrutiny
of affected and concerned groups and to the political pressures that
those groups could bring in favor of an opposite policy.77 Yet Davis'
criticism fails to address adequately the underlying problems that must
be resolved in order for the police to change their behavior.
Davis did not deny that the department has substantial incentives
not to publicize the nonenforcement practice in question-indeed, not
to admit at official levels that such a practice exists. Organizational
analyses useful in developing strategies to remove or lessen these incen-
tives are needed.
One approach might be to redirect political pressures toward the
legislature. By openly admitting that police resources are inadequate
for full enforcement of all laws, the legislature might lessen the pres-
sures upon the police to hide or obscure nonenforcement practices. But
larger political problems embedded in the mechanics of image-making,
pressure-group politics, and the general art of election-winning make
such behavior by the legislature unlikely.7" Indeed, legislatures often
75. Id at 39, 156-57.
76. See supra note 74.
77. Id at 106, 156-58.
78. See, e.g., A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 51-74 (1957) (economic
theory of decisionmaking in which legislature increases expenditures until the vote gain of the
marginal dollar spent equals the vote loss of the marginal dollar financed).
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intentionally use strikingly vague phrases when delegating enforcement
responsibilities to regulatory agencies. This reduces the legislature's
exposure to various pressure groups and deflects those pressures to the
regulatory agency to which the delegation is made. 9
d. Identifying these decisions by types: If the Chicago Police De-
partment had gone public with its decision not to enforce all laws fully,
the decision would have fallen into the upper region of the NE section,
because (1) it was the Department's publicly proclaimed position, (2) it
was of great social and regulatory importance, and (3) it applied to
cases consisting of recurring facts defined by statute as criminal. The
actual decision, however, of the Chicago Police Department not to take
responsibility for allocating the Department's limited enforcement re-
sources falls into the lower regions of the NE section of Figure 4 be-
cause that decision was secret and the Department did not want to
acknowledge it. That decision, moreover, was a vast delegation of
power to lower echelon personnel, allowing them to decide how to allo-
cate the Department's resources. One result of that type of delegation,
as reported by Davis, is that officers on the street tend to decide inde-
pendently not to make arrests for the possession of small amounts of
marijuana.80 These decisions, limiting enforcement of laws governing
marijuana possession, are appropriately included in the SE section of
Figure 4 because they deal with recurring factual settings and are, indi-
vidually, of trivial social and regulatory importance. Collectively,
however, they constitute a descriptive rule of how the police depart-
ment operates with respect to marijuana possession. That descriptive
rule is appropriately placed on the right side of the illustration, approx-
imately on the border of the NE and SE sections in terms of social and
regulatory importance, and at midrange depth because the rule, and
the aggregate of decisions constituting it, while not directly publicized,
are nevertheless known to most persons directly affected by it.
4. Preserving Flexibility to Handle the Unforeseeable
Agencies that adjudicate matters with an eye toward future adjudi-
cations involving similar issues, albeit in varying factual contexts, may
say as little as possible in present decisions in order to preserve flex-
ibility for addressing later cases. In this way agencies can prevent any
79. See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 634 (1944) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (Congress "resolved" controversial issue by delegating task to administrative official).
80. POLICE DISCRETION, supra note 71, at 6-7.
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possible embarrassment resulting from decisions that conflict with stan-
dards or principles enunciated in the earlier decisions. Louis Hector, a
former member of the CAB, pointed out this phenomenon. His own
agency directed its opinion writing staff to avoid any nonessential pro-
nouncements in order to maximize the CAB's freedom to dispose of
future cases as it saw fit.8 Friendly noted cases in which the CAB did
at first spell out standards, only to decide later cases in ways that ap-
peared inconsistent with those standards.82
From the information provided by Hector and Friendly, it appears
that the CAB either was actually or believed itself to be insufficiently
informed to decide the issues before it. Subsequent cases involved un-
anticipated new facts, which necessitated a changed approach. The
CAB continually revised its decisional approach to the competition
question in light of new facts discovered in each new case. The agency
handled these cases as if they belonged in the eastern section of Figure
4, in the areas reserved for cases composed of recurring relevant facts,
but the agency's limited vision prevented it from recognizing the full
set of relevant decisional factors. Had the agency been more ade-
quately informed, it would have avoided deciding cases as if they fell
into the NE section of Figure 4, when they actually fell in the NW
section or on the border between the two sections. To the extent that
the CAB intentionally avoided providing a rationale for its actions (in
the ways described by Hector), the agency knew that it was dealing
with cases composed of recurring facts; that was the reason it sought to
avoid any explanation that could tie its hands in future cases. In these
cases, therefore, the CAB was deciding cases which properly fell into
the NE section, but which it wished to treat as the unique type of case
represented in the western section of Figure 4. In order to achieve this
result, the CAB refused to disclose the actual rationale for its decisions,
thereby limiting or eliminating their effects as precedents.
Decisions like these-dealing with sets of facts that an agency rec-
ognizes as recurring and in which the agency does not disclose its ac-
tual rationale so as not to create a precedent-properly belong in the
lower ranges of the vertical dimension of this NE section. The best
professional critique may not be to demand that the agency enunciate
decisional standards despite its actual or perceived ignorance, but
rather to consider the steps to take to alleviate that ignorance. In-depth
81. Hector, supra note 55, at 942-43.
82. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 21, at 97 (CAB chairman quoted as saying the CAB's
philosophy changes day to day).
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studies of the operation of the airline industry, its economics, its tech-
nology, the processes of technological change, and the process of eco-
nomic change and continuous planning would have given the agency
more usable information. In those circumstances, its opinions might
have been more forthright and comprehensive. The standards embod-
ied in those opinions might have better withstood the repeated assaults
of industry lawyers in subsequent litigation.
5. Avoiding Distraction by Overworked Officials
Davis has discerned a pervasive reluctance by low level officials to
disclose decisional standards that they themselves have developed.
This reluctance to disclose internally developed decisional standards
has affected parole board members,8 3 officials examining applications
regarding forfeitures of vehicles used in the narcotics trade,8 4 and other
low level administrators. This reluctance derives from their belief that
access to those standards by persons who have been or who will be
affected by their decisions will subject the officials to increased chal-
lenges about the way they apply the standards.
This perception is one of substantially increased workload. The
officials will have to spend time justifying past decisions and countering
objections, rather than concentrating on making other decisions. Al-
though the perceived potential for an increased workload may be exag-
gerated, one cannot dismiss it out of hand. On Figure 4, the standards
that these low level officials employ properly fall midway on the north-
south (regulatory importance) dimension, to the east on the east-west
(fact recurrence) dimension, and at the lower end of the vertical or
depth (secrecy) dimension.
Officials who make decisions pursuant to a set of rules or stan-
dards which are not available to the public do not employ unconfined
or unstructured discretionary power. Their decisions are confined and
structured by the set of rules and standards that they are in fact using.
They could make their decisions appear more confined and structured,
however, if they publicized the rules and standards. To the extent that
it is desirable to encourage officials to disclose the previously secret
rules and standards used in deciding cases, one should consider what
means may reduce the incentives to maintain secrecy.
83. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 129-30.
84. Id at 109-10.
85. Id at 126-31.
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One could reduce that incentive if one could find ways to insulate
deciding officials from the need to respond to contentions of dissatisfied
or potentially affected persons. One might provide this insulation by
routing complaints to officials other than those who made the decisions.
A threshold showing of substantial noncompliance with the guidelines
might be required before a complaint would officially be taken under
advisement.
6. Avoiding Bureaucratic Rigidity
A decisionmaking official may occasionally conclude that the mer-
its of an applicant in a particular case are unusually compelling and
that a favorable decision will advance the goals of the statutory pro-
gram. Yet the rules may make no provision for such a decision; indeed,
they may literally require the opposite decision. A regulatory agency
or upper level official so confronted probably would decide in accord-
ance with the statutory purpose, justifying its nonliteral approach to the
statute in an accompanying opinion.86
A lower echelon official may not have the same opportunity to
justify a nonliteral approach to the rules. Superiors may insist upon
literal observance of the rules. This may be partially due to their recog-
nition of their own inability to review such exceptions for coherence
and general conformity with the statutory framework and goals. Such
an attitude is not to be too quickly condemned; it exhibits a degree of
sophistication about the extent of the resources that rational supervi-
sion over the administration of flexible rules would entail, and a per-
haps correct perception that those resources are lacking. Confronted
with systemic inflexibility, a lower echelon decisionmaker may occa-
sionally decide as he believes the merits dictate, but in such cases he
will tend not to explain the decision's nonconformity. To do so would
merely call attention to the deviant act, possibly causing his superiors
to reverse the decision and to issue a reprimand. It is sometimes true
that the superiors of such an official may become aware of his occasion-
al flexible applications but tolerate them on the ground that they trust
the judgment of that particular official. Selective tolerance preserves
the superiors' freedom to correct deviant decisions by other lower eche-
lon officials whose judgment they trust less. Being selectively tolerant
in secret also avoids subjecting themselves to the critical judgments of
their own superiors that they would experience if they openly approved
of their subordinate's flexible applications of the rules. These decisions
86. See id at 110 (publishing rules invites litigation).
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fall at the lower levels of the north-south (social and regulatory impor-
tance) dimension, toward the midrange of the east-west (fact recur-
rence) dimension (because it is the unusual facts of the cases that impel
the decisionmaker to deviate from the assigned rules), and at the low
end of the vertical (secrecy) dimension.
7. Avoiding the Creation of Normative Rules of Behavior by Lower
Echelon Officials
When an agency deals with large numbers of cases, most of which
are individually insignificant apart from their impact as precedent or as
behavioral guides for other persons, the agency may delegate decision-
making authority to large numbers of low echelon personnel. A prob-
lem then arises when a low ranking official decides a case that falls into
a potentially recurring factual pattern. The problem is exacerbated
when the decision in question is a decision about how officials will treat
certain behavior that can be planned in advance, for example, in the
area of taxation. Public disclosure of the decision made by the low
ranking official may lead people to believe that his disposition of the
single case manifests agency policy for similar cases. Of course, if the
agency knew that the case in question raised policy issues of broad im-
port, then higher ranking officials of the agency would consider the is-
sues and their decision would speak for the agency. But if the agency is
not aware that a particular decision has widespread ramifications, it
may be too late for his superiors to reconsider the disposition of that
case. In the case of decisions delegated to low level personnel, there-
fore, an agency may thus seek to limit their disclosure to the named
parties to the decision and to deny information to the general public.
For many years this was the approach of the Internal Revenue Service
in rendering private tax rulings.87 When the decisionmaking of lower
echelon officials is kept secret from the general public in order to avoid
the creation of behavior-affecting precedent, their decisions fall in the
eastern portion of Figure 4, in the lower range of the secrecy dimen-
sion, and in the southern half because of the trivial social or regulatory
consequences of each decision taken individually.
B. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
Almost all of the examples in this section fall in the NE section
87. See Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Prin-
coiles, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1, 19-24 (1962) (describing I.R.S. system of private letter rulings,
attendant concerns and problems).
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and in the northern regions of the SE section of Figure 4. One reason
why the agency or responsible officials chose not to publicize the deci-
sions was to avoid the creation of a public precedent. This was true in
all of the examples (2) through (7). In examples (2) and (7), the agency
sought to avoid a precedent which would have discouraged the regu-
lated public from complying with the goals of the statutory program
that the agency was administering. In these two examples, failure to
maintain secrecy would have diminished the deterrent effect of penal-
ties and carried the potential for encouraging transactions designed to
conform to standards which higher echelon personnel had not ap-
proved. In examples (4) through (7), the agency or its officials sought
to avoid the creation of a public precedent that could be used to chal-
lenge its future regulatory actions.
A second reason for the maintenance of decisional secrecy was or-
ganizational: secrecy played a role in overcoming organizational defi-
ciencies such as rule inflexibility, caseloads which allowed no time for
decisional explanations or justifications, and delayed review by superi-
ors. Thus, in example (5) officials were not given adequate time to de-
fend the validity of their decisions and there was no way for affected
members of the public to complain other than directly confronting the
deciding officials. Secret standards enabled these officials to minimize
the time spent defending their decisions and disposing of their assigned
caseloads. In example (6), where officials decided in a context in which
the inflexible rules failed to provide for exceptional situations in which
rigid adherence to the rule caused injustice, decisional secrecy was an
informal response by a perceptive lower ranking official to oppressive
bureaucratic constraint. In example (7), secrecy contains the impact of
potentially precedential decisions prior to review by higher ranking
officials.
CONCLUSION
This Article identifies particular characteristics of agency
caseloads that are or might be expected to be associated with differing
decisional approaches or techniques. These characteristics include:
(i) those that render agency decisionmaking more or less suitable for
the processes visualized by Professor Davis and Judge Friendly in
which decisional standards gradually emerge as an agency attains more
experience in the disposition of cases; (ii) those that are more or less
conducive to delegating authority to subordinates, with or without op-
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erational standards; and (iii) those that encourage governmental agen-
cies to act openly or in secret.
Precision and identification have always facilitated the develop-
ment of understanding. The extent to which a problem is understood
usually defines the real potentialities for remedying or mitigating it.
The preceding examination of official decisionmaking reveals some of
the complexities latent in the generic phenomenon referred to under
the labels of "administrative discretion" or "discretionary decisionmak-
ing." Professor Davis, who has been most active in developing tech-
niques for confining, checking, and guiding the exercise of
discretionary powers by officials, has himself called for further investi-
gation beyond his own extensive forays into governmental bureaucra-
cies in order to develop criteria for optimizing the mix of rules,
standards, and discretionary power available in each decisional con-
text. The several techniques for confining, checking, and guiding the
exercise of discretionary power which he has proposed may be more
suitable to some categories of administrative caseloads than to others,
and to some levels of a bureaucratic hierarchy than to others.
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